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A Connection of Central Significance: Sufficiency of Occupancy and Aboriginal Title 
In William v British Columbia, 2012 BCCA 2851, the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal is presented with two different interpretations of what satisfies the occupancy 
requirement of an Aboriginal title claim. At the time of William, the courts remained 
without clear direction, as the Supreme Court remained largely silent on the issue in 
Delgamuukw v British Columbia,2 the leading case on Aboriginal title writ large. As 
noted by Groberman J in William, the Delgamuukw court “does not fully address the 
quality of occupancy necessary to support a title claim.”3 That is, although the Court in 
Delgamuukw makes clear that a claim for Aboriginal title requires physical occupation of 
the lands in question, it does not explicitly delineate the necessary or essential 
characteristics of that occupation.4 This lacuna persists in the most recent Supreme Court 
of Canada case regarding title, R v Marshall; R v Bernard.5  
This lack of explicit guidance as to what will suffice for physical occupation—
and the resulting interpretive latitude—becomes a central issue in William. Both parties 
rely heavily on the following passage from Delgamuukw: 
Physical occupation may be established in a variety of ways, ranging from 
the construction of dwellings through cultivation and enclosure of fields to 
1 2012 BCCA 285 [“William”]  
2 [1997] 3 SCR 1010 [“Delgamuukw”] 
3 supra note 1 at para 220.  
4 See supra note 2 at para 149.  
5 2005 SCC 43 [“Marshall; Bernard”] 
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regular use of definite tracks of land for hunting, fishing, or otherwise 
exploiting its resources6  
The parties offer their own interpretations of what kind of occupancy was 
contemplated in this passage. The appellant, Chief Roger William, forwards a more 
expanded understanding of sufficient occupancy akin to the one found by the Trial Judge, 
Vickers J. On this view,  “regular” and not intense use is emphasized, such that title could 
be established not only through the occupation of settlements and areas cultivated for 
agriculture, but also through exclusive, regular use of hunting and fishing grounds.7 The 
appellant argued that this less demanding, regular use of defined hunting and fishing 
areas could grant title to those areas themselves. 8 The Trial Judge accepted this 
argument, and dismissed the respondent’s more restrictive “postage stamp” account, 
doing so because a narrow, site-specific account did not, in his view, do justice to the 
collective history of Aboriginal peoples: 
The plaintiff characterizes the foregoing arguments of the defendants as a 
postage stamp approach to Aboriginal title. I think that is a fair  
description. There is no evidence to support a conclusion that Aboriginal  
people ever lived this kind of  postage stamp existence.9 
In contrast to the “regular” use account of the appellant, the respondents noted 
Delgamuukw’s emphasis on “definite tracts” of land to argue for a “site-specific” model 
on which title could only be accorded to areas particularly delineated and intensely used. 
The Court of Appeal adopted this site-specific model, agreeing with the respondents and 
holding that Aboriginal title grounded in resource-exploitation could only be found in 
6 Supra note 2 at para 149. 
7 Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700 at para 684[“Trial 
Judgment”].  
8 Ibid at paras 582-3.
9 Ibid at para 610.  
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strictly defined, intensely used areas, such as particular hunting grounds, “salt licks, or 
“particular rocks or promontories used for netting salmon.”10 In its reasons, the Court of 
Appeal also held that the appellant’s position could be characterized fairly as “territorial,” 
and that claims of this nature departed from what was contemplated as sufficient 
occupancy in Delgamuukw. Furthermore, it held that such ‘territorial’ claims were 
inconsistent with the overall rationale of Aboriginal title and the broader reconciliatory 
goal of Aboriginal rights writ large.11  
The end result of this interpretive dilemma will have important jurisprudential 
consequences. As noted by the Court of Appeal itself, the William case is an 
“extraordinary one:” a tremendous amount of resources has been expended by both sides, 
leading to a vigorous, difficult, and complex history of litigation, and the construction of 
a “very complete record.”12 For these reasons, the Court of Appeal describes it as being 
“in many respects a test case on the issue of Aboriginal title” presenting “a suitable 
vehicle for development of the law.”13 The Court of Appeal’s decision has been appealed 
to and heard by the Supreme Court of Canada, with a decision expected before the end of 
the year. If the Court were to endorse the respondent’s position—which is essentially 
coextensive with the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s findings—Aboriginal title 
claims would become extremely difficult to make out, perhaps further hindering the 
overall goal of the constitutional protection of Aboriginal rights in section 35 of the 
10 William at para 221.  
11 Ibid at paras 214, 219-239. 
12 Ibid at paras 165, 26.  
13 Ibid at para 165.  
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Constitution Act, 198214: the reconciliation of historical Aboriginal and modern rights 
held under general Canadian law.15 
 The goal of this paper is to rehearse and critique the Court of Appeal’s reasons for 
endorsing the respondent’s site-specific model of sufficient occupation, and to offer an 
alternative method of answering the sufficient occupation question arising out of 
Delgamuukw. Ultimately, it will be argued that the three arguments offered by the court 
do not, without more, establish that the site specific-model is any more desirable or 
jurisprudentially defensible than the one offered by the appellants.  
 Furthermore, it will be argued that either position misapprehends the nature of the 
occupancy test arising out the Supreme Court’s decisions in Delgamuukw and Marshall; 
Bernard. The question of sufficient occupancy should be understood not by measuring a 
claim’s concordance with an acceptable category of claims, site-specific or otherwise. 
Rather, it should be a fact-specific inquiry aiming to determine if the occupancy proven 
on the evidence comports with the broader and more fundamental goals of Aboriginal 
title. That is, the court must determine, on the facts, if the occupancy claimed is sufficient 
to warrant an overall finding that the claimant group’s connection with the land is of 
central significance to the Aboriginal people making the claim.  
 The paper will proceed as follows. First, we will rehearse and critique each of the 
arguments for the site-specific model forwarded by the Court of Appeal in William. In 
addition to demonstrating that the site-specific model is not as tenable as the Court of 
Appeal suggests, our analysis will also reveal the error of attempting to parse questions of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11 
[“Constitution Act, 1982”].  
15 Brian Slattery, “The Metamorphosis of Aboriginal Title,” The Canadian Bar Review, 
vol 85, 2006 pg 281 [Metamorphosis].	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sufficient occupancy through categories of acceptable and non-acceptable title claims. 
Following this analysis, we will move to a constructive phase in which we suggest an 
alternative, flexible, and fact-specific standard for occupation, one which is consistent 
with the jurisprudential tests in Delgamuukw and Marshall; Bernard, and the broader 
reconciliatory goals of Aboriginal title.  
 We turn first to the Court of Appeal’s reasons for endorsing the site-specific 
model. Emerging from the reasons are three distinct arguments, each of which the Court 
of Appeal seems to present as determinative of to the issue. These three arguments are 
adumbrated by the Court of Appeal in the following passage:  
 
  I also agree with the defendants that a territorial claim for Aboriginal title  
  does not meet the tests in Delgamuukw and in Marshall; Bernard. Further, 
  as I will attempt to explain, I do not see a broad territorial claim as fitting  
  within the purposes behind s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 or the  
  rationale for the common law’s recognition of Aboriginal title. Finally, I  
  see broad territorial claims as antithetical to the goal of reconciliation,  
  which demands that, so far as possible, the traditional rights of First  
  Nations be fully respected without placing unnecessary limitations on the  
  sovereignty of the Crown or on the aspirations of all Canadians,   
  Aboriginal and non-aboriginal.16 
  
 The first argument is one of jurisprudential consistency, the claim being that a 
non-site specific claim (characterized as “territorial” in the above passage) does not 
satisfy the requirements set out in the previous leading cases on title. The Court of 
Appeal points to several passages in both Delgamuukw and Marshall; Bernard to 
substantiate this claim. On the contrary, and with respect, a careful analysis of these 
passages shows that this conclusion is not warranted.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Supra note 1 at para 219.  
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 Consider first the passages highlighted from Delgamuukw that the Court of 
Appeal sees as strongly suggesting “that an intensive presence at a particular site was 
what the Court had in mind.”17 The first, already reproduced above, goes as follows:  
 
  Physical occupation may be established in a variety of ways, ranging from 
  the construction of dwellings through cultivation and enclosure of fields to 
  regular use of definite tracks of land for hunting, fishing, or otherwise  
  exploiting its resources18 
 
The Court of Appeal emphasizes Lamer CJC’s use of the word “definite” in Delgamuukw 
to draw its conclusion that specific, intensely used sites are the sufficient occupancy 
standard:  
 
  In particular, I note that the examples of title lands given at para. 149 are  
  well-defined, intensively used areas. The reference to hunting, fishing, and 
  other resource extraction activities is coupled with a specific description of 
  the lands so used as “definite” tracts of land. I agree with British   
  Columbia’s assertion that what was contemplated were specific sites on  
  which hunting, fishing, or resource extraction activities took place on a  
  regular and intensive basis.19 
 
The Court of Appeal’s argument here, seems correct if one accepts, without more, that 
the Court’s use of “definite” in this context meant something like specifically bound, 
particular sites under heavy use. On what is given in the passage directly above, this may 
be a plausible conclusion.  However, the rest of the paragraph 149, not referenced by the 
Court of Appeal, weakens the claim:  
 
  In considering whether occupation sufficient to ground title is established,  
  “one must take into account the group’s size, manner of life, material  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 William at para 220.  
18 Supra note 2 at para 149.  
19 William at para 221 [emphasis added].  
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  resources, and technological abilities, and the character of the lands  
  claimed”: Brian Slattery, Understanding Aboriginal Rights, at p. 758.20 
 
 There are two things to note about the balance of the paragraph. First, the Court in 
Delgamuukw explicitly states that it is addressing the question of sufficient occupancy 
before setting out a list of factors to consider when determining sufficiency of any one 
claim of occupation. That is, Lamer CJC is actually telling us “what was contemplated,” 
by providing interpretive guidance on the sufficiency occupancy issue. He does so by 
citing a list of factors given by Professor Slattery.  Worryingly, the Court of Appeal, in 
conducting its analysis of the question for which the guidance is directed, fails to 
reference this guidance. Instead, it seizes upon one word of an earlier phrase to conclude 
that specific sites of intense use were contemplated. Rather providing evidence for its 
overall claim that Delgamuukw strongly suggests a site-specific model, the passage relied 
on by the Court of Appeal fails to note that Lamer CJC actually states, and note merely 
suggests, how to go about answering the question at hand. These directions are ignored 
by the Court in its analysis. 
 The second salient point with regards to the unstated portion of para 149 is what 
the guidance itself tells us about the occupancy issue. Lamer CJC chose to provide a list 
of factors to inform a court’s analysis of occupation, each of which will depend on the 
facts of a particular aboriginal group and claim area, and not on the nature of the claim 
itself. That is, the Chief Justice’s concern does not mandate that a specific type of claim 
will succeed and others will fail. Rather, the factors listed could plausibly inform a 
court’s discretion in deciding whether some factual instance of occupancy, not the nature 
of the claim as site-specific or of a certain intensity, will ground title.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Supra note 2 at para 149	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 Furthermore, if it is these various factors that are to inform a court’s analysis of 
occupation, it seems inconsistent, or at least worrisome, for a court to simultaneously 
hold itself fast to accepting only intense site-specific claims. Group size, especially in 
instances of particularly large groups, may preclude clear boundary drawing, or at the 
least, make it difficult. Similarly, a group’s manner of life, such as a nomadic or semi-
nomadic style of living, may preclude the possibility of identifying bound specific sites, 
or of finding suitably intense use on any one understanding or standard. Similarly, 
material resources and the character of claimed lands may further make determinations of 
intense use difficult because of movements or changes necessitated by changes in 
climate, food, or available shelter. The panoply of contingencies that arise out of these 
factors make it difficult to accept that the court’s role in answering the specific-
occupancy question is to parse occupation into specific or territorial claims. Rather than 
suggesting that Delgamuukw contemplated intense, site-specific uses, the factors outlined 
by the Chief Justice point more to a fact-specific, context bound inquiry. That is, it is 
more consistent to envision the court’s role as exercising discretion when determining 
whether or not some one instance of occupation, on the facts, will be sufficient to ground 
title. At this point, we can say, confidently, that this particular paragraph, read in its 
entirety, does not support the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that site-specific model of 
occupancy was contemplated.  
 We can now move to the second set of references to Delgamuukw which the 
Court of Appeal sees as endorsing a site-specific model. They are gestured to in this 
passage:  
 
  The Court’s specific references to the difficulty that nomadic peoples  
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  might face in proving title is also telling. While, as the Court pointed out  
  in Marshall; Bernard, there is no reason that semi-nomadic or nomadic  
  groups would be disqualified from proving title, their traditional use of  
  land will often have included large regions in which they did not have an  
  adequate regular presence to support a title claim. That is not to say, of  
  course, that such groups will be unable to prove title to specific sites  
  within their traditional territories.21 
The only explicit reference to nomadic peoples in Delgamuukw occurs at paragraph 139. 
It follows Lamer CJC’s discussion of the relationship between Aboriginal title and 
Aboriginal rights writ large, in which he states that s. 35(1) rights fall along a spectrum 
with regards to their degree of connection with the land. At one end of the spectrum sit 
activity rights wholly disconnected from particular areas of land, which protect a group’s 
ability to engage in culturally integral practices, customs and traditions, as affirmed in R v 
Van der Peet.22 As noted in R v Adams, these certain activity rights may be more directly 
connected to the land, insofar as protection may be granted to engage in particular 
activities on specific tracts of land.23 Finally, at the opposite end of the spectrum sits title 
itself, which is a right to the land itself.24 After making the spectrum-of-rights point, he 
makes the reference to nomadic peoples highlighted by the Court of Appeal:  
  Because aboriginal rights can vary with respect to their degree of   
  connection with the land, some aboriginal groups may be unable to make  
  out a claim to title, but will nevertheless possess aboriginal rights that are  
  recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1), including site-specific rights to  
  engage in particular activities. As I explained in Adams, this may occur in  
  the case of nomadic peoples who varied “the location of their settlements  
  with the season and changing circumstances” (at para. 27). The fact that  
  aboriginal peoples were non-sedentary, however (at para. 27) does not  
  alter the fact that nomadic peoples survived through reliance on the land  
  prior to contact with Europeans, and further, that many of the practices,  
  customs, and traditions of nomadic peoples that took place on the land  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 William at para 222 [emphasis added].  
22 [1996] 2 SCR 507 [“Van der Peet”].  
23 [1996] 3 SCR 101 [“Adams”].  
24 Delgamuukw at para 138.  
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  were integral to their distinctive cultures.25 
From the reasons themselves, it is not immediately clear why the Court of Appeal finds 
this reference to nomadic peoples as a reason to endorse the site-specific model of title. 
Presumably, the court is suggesting that the reason why Lamer CJC would note that 
nomadic groups may face difficulty making it out title claims is because the court in 
Delgamuukw had a site-specific model of sufficient occupancy in mind. Though this tacit 
suggestion seems plausible, further consideration casts doubt on its strength.  
 The force of the Court of Appeal’s argument begins to fade when we analyze the 
context in which Lamer CJC deploys the example of nomadic peoples. The Chief Justice 
uses the example after setting out the spectrum-like relationship between aboriginal rights 
writ large and any one right’s connection with the land. The spectrum comments, in turn, 
form part of a discussion about the relationship between Aboriginal title and Aboriginal 
rights generally,26 not a discussion about what will be sufficient to ground title itself. The 
upshot of the paragraph is to demonstrate that rights and title are separable: that a failure 
to successfully show title does not preclude a finding of other rights. This is consistent 
with the overall finding of the court in Adams that a finding of title is not a necessary 
condition for a successful activity right claim.27 With an understanding of context then, it 
seems implausible to move, without more, to a conclusion that this reference to nomadic 
peoples is “telling” in the sense of suggesting that the Delgamuukw court had a site-
specific notion of title in mind. Rather, all that can be gleaned from the passage is the 
Supreme Court’s recognition that title claims are separable from aboriginal rights claims.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Ibid 139 [emphasis added].  
26 See Delgamuukw at paras 137-9. 	  
27 Supra note 23 at para 27.  
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At this point, having shown that this second example does little to buttress the Court of 
Appeal’s argument, we can move on to its third reference to Delgamuukw.  
 The reference to the third Delgamuukw passage is nuanced, and represents some 
subtle reasoning on the part of the Court of Appeal. Groberman J writes:  
 
  Finally, with respect to Delgamuukw, I note Lamer C.J.C.’s comments at  
  paras. 150 and 151 dealing with the need for a group to demonstrate that a  
  piece of land was of central significance to their distinctive culture. He  
  considered this to be a “crucial” part of the test for Aboriginal title, but  
  found that it was unnecessary to treat it as a specific element of the proof  
  of title, because any land that met the other criteria for Aboriginal title  
  would, of necessity, be of central significance to the culture. That position  
  is a sensible one if the occupation needed to found a claim for title is site- 
  specific; it is not, however, if undifferentiated land within a large territory  
  is to be included in a title claim.28 
Here, the Court of Appeal is making an argument from internal consistency. Lamer CJC 
makes the statement that demonstration of the other criteria for title is sufficient to prove 
the crucial “central significance” requirement. The Court of Appeal argues that in order 
to make this statement intelligible, one of those other criteria, namely, sufficiency of 
occupancy, must be site-specific and not territorial. The unstated premise of this 
argument is that somehow, site-specific use itself indicates or is evidence of central 
significance. If we can accept that premise, and therefore, the former entails the latter, 
than the need for additional proof of the latter is redundant. Therefore, the Court of 
Appeal concludes, this passage indicates that the Delgamuukw court envisioned a site-
specific level of sufficient occupancy.  
 Again, as presented, the argument seems plausible. However, consider the 
relevant Delgamuukw passages referenced by the Court of Appeal in their entirety:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Supra note 1 at para 223.	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  In Van der Peet, I drew a distinction between those practices, customs and 
  traditions of aboriginal peoples which were “an aspect of, or took place  
  in” the society of the aboriginal group asserting the claim and those  
  which were “a central and significant part of the society’s distinctive  
  culture” (at para. 55). The latter stood apart because they “made the  
  culture of the society distinctive . . . it was one of the things that truly  
  made the society what it was” (at para. 55, emphasis in original). The  
  same requirement operates in the determina- tion of the proof of aboriginal 
  title. As I said in Adams, a claim to title is made out when a group can  
  demonstrate “that their connection with the piece of land . . . was of a  
  central significance to their distinctive culture” (at para. 26). 
  Although this remains a crucial part of the test for aboriginal rights, given  
  the occupancy requirement in the test for aboriginal title, I cannot imag-  
  ine a situation where this requirement would actually serve to limit or  
  preclude a title claim. The requirement exists for rights short of title  
  because it is necessary to distinguish between those prac- tices which were 
  central to the culture of claimants and those which were more incidental.  
  However, in the case of title, it would seem clear that any land that was  
  occupied pre-sovereignty, and which the parties have maintained a  
  substantial connection with since then, is sufficiently important to be of  
  central significance to the culture of the claimants. As a result, I do not  
  think it is necessary to include explicitly this element as part of the test for 
  aboriginal title.29 
We can see Lamer CJC making several moves. First, he outlines the content of what I 
have called the central significance requirement, and its origins and importance in both in 
Van der Peet (with regards to activity rights) and Adams (with regards to Aboriginal 
title.) Next, he notes that though central significance requirement retains its salience in 
the test for title as a “crucial” element, the court need not treat it as a separate element of 
the test. He then offers his explanation for this difference: “it would seem clear that any 
land that was occupied pre-sovereignty, and which the parties have maintained a 
substantial connection with since then, is sufficiently important to be of central 
significance to the culture of the claimants.” That is, the other elements of the title test, 
namely occupancy and the maintenance of a substantial connection, are sufficient 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Supra note 2 at paras 150-1.  
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grounds from which to infer central significance. This provides some support for what I 
called the Court of Appeal’s unstated premise above: that site-specific use itself indicates 
central significance. Thus, this observation moves us towards being able to offer a 
justification of the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the central significance redundancy 
supports the site-specific view of occupancy.  
 However, as careful readers will have noticed, Lamer CJC’s explanation of the 
central significance redundancy cites both the requirements of occupancy (“occupied pre-
sovereignty) and sustained temporal connection (“which the parties have maintained a 
substantial connection with since then”). That is, Lamer CJC’s conclusion that the central 
significance requirement is redundant in the case of Aboriginal title is based on the 
combined presence of both elements of the title test. It seems, on a straightforward 
reading, that it is the combination of these two prongs that allows the Chief Justice to 
make an inference of central significance, not just the satisfaction occupancy 
requirement. This makes intuitive sense, as neither prong, on its own, could ground an 
inference to central significance. Tracts of land may be occupied regularly for various 
reasons which may not entail “central significance,” for instance, a specific path used to 
move between two actually culturally significant sites.  Similarly, substantial connection 
over time may be the product of necessity: for instance, a certain food source’s affinity 
for a particular area, and be comopletely unrelated to the identity of a particular 
Aboriginal culture. Nothing about either of these features, on their own, point to central 
significance.  However, as the Chief Justice notes, the presence of both occupation and 
significant connection sustained over time make the inference more reasonable. The 
upshot of all of this is simple: the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the redundancy of 
	   Wilson	  14 
the central significance requirement with regards to title is evidence of a tacit site-specific 
understanding of occupancy cannot be substantiated on the evidence offered in 
Delgamuukw. The Chief Justice’s explanation for the redundancy explicitly sites both 
occupancy and sustained temporality, and nothing else.  Without more, the redundancy is 
no more “sensible” on a site-specific model rather than a territorial model.  
 If the foregoing is persuasive, we can now say that the Court of Appeal’s finding 
that “several passages in Delgamuukw strongly suggest that an intensive presence at a 
particular site was what the Court had in mind”30 is not tenable. The first passage cited by 
the Court of Appeal, in which “definite” tracts of land were emphasized, did not point to 
a site-specific model of occupancy, to the exclusion of any other type of claim. The 
balance of the passage, which was not referenced by the Court of Appeal, offered explicit 
guidance about undertaking a fact-specific analysis of several particular factors to 
determine if sufficient occupancy was made out. Similarly, when considered in context, 
the second passage, far from endorsing a site-specific model of occupancy, serves to 
reinforce the separable nature of Aboriginal title and other section 35 rights, such as site-
specific rights and activity rights. Finally, the Court of Appeal’s noting of Lamer CJC’s 
comments about the redundancy of the central significance requirement does not support 
a site-specific understanding of title. Rather, it serves simply to emphasize that if the 
other requirements of title are made out, the inference to central significance can be 
satisfied. There is no reason why a site-specific model, rather than a more diffuse 
understanding of occupancy, would make the redundancy more “sensible.”  
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 We can now move on to the Court of Appeal’s discussion of title in Marshall; 
Bernard, which it holds “is even stronger in showing that Aboriginal title must be 
demonstrated on a site-specific rather than territorial basis.”31This is the second part of 
the Court of Appeal’s larger, first argument that a non-site specific claim is inconsistent 
with the jurisprudence. Note also that the Court of Appeals claim is now categorical in 
character: title “must be demonstrated” via a site-specific basis, as opposed to the 
phrasing of the argument a few paragraphs earlier, where it said that “title cannot 
generally be proved on a territorial basis.”32  
 Consider the Court of Appeal’s reasons for this stronger finding drawn from 
Marshall; Bernard:  
 
  Marshall; Bernard, as I read it, is even stronger in showing that   
  Aboriginal title must be demonstrated on a site-specific rather than  
  territorial basis. The majority expressly dealt with the question of whether  
  hunting or fishing or the taking of other resources from land could found a 
  title claim. At para. 58, it agreed that such activities could, where they  
  were sufficiently regular and exclusive, be a basis for title. It also   
  cautioned, however, that more typically, such activities will found only  
  claims to specific Aboriginal rights. 
 
  The majority’s equation of sufficient occupancy for Aboriginal title with  
  the common law requirements to show title by virtue of possession is also  
  important. It supports the views that title must be claimed on a site- 
  specific basis, and that a certain regularity and intensity of presence is  
  needed before it will count as “occupancy”.33 
 
Each of the above paragraphs contains one sub-argument. We shall consider each in turn.  
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 In the first, the Court of Appeal holds that a certain observation of the Court at 
paragraph 50 of Marshall; Bernard affirms the necessity of a site-specific understanding 
of occupancy. Here is the Marshall paragraph in question:  
 
  It follows from the requirement of exclusive occupation that exploiting the 
  land, rivers or seaside for hunting, fishing or other resources may translate  
  into aboriginal title to the land if the activity was sufficiently regular and  
  exclusive to comport with title at common law.   However, more typically, 
  seasonal hunting and fishing rights exercised in a particular area will  
  translate to a hunting or fishing right.  This is plain from this Court’s  
  decisions in Van der Peet, Nikal, Adams and Côté.   In those cases,  
  aboriginal peoples asserted and proved ancestral utilization of particular  
  sites for fishing and harvesting the products of the sea.  Their forebears  
  had come back to the same place to fish or harvest each year since time  
  immemorial.  However, the season over, they left, and the land could be  
  traversed and used by anyone.  These facts gave rise not to aboriginal title, 
  but to aboriginal hunting and fishing rights.34 
 
The Court of Appeal has rightly recognized that the Supreme Court is advocating caution. 
The courts must keep title and other Aboriginal rights distinct. However, there is a 
difference in the character of the caution and the conclusion that the Court of Appeal 
draws from it. Look again at McLachlin CJC’s phrasing in Marshall; Bernard. After 
recognizing that certain resource-exploiting activities can ground title, she cautions that 
more typically, that is, more often than not, such activities will translate into a hunting or 
fishing right. She then offers three cases that exemplify this. The Court of Appeal, 
however, takes this caution to ground an equivocal, categorical conclusion that title must 
be demonstrated on a site-specific basis. This finding is not warranted. The Chief 
Justice’s caution is given to emphasize the important distinction between title and other 
rights. The fact that caution is granted to keep these two concepts distinct, at a general 
level, does not license a conclusion that occupancy, a particular feature of the title test, 
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must be understood as site-specific. Furthermore, the caution is that typically, and not 
always, resource-exploiting activities will ground activity rights and not title. This is 
consistent with the rest of Marshall; Bernard, which includes McLachlin CJC’s finding 
that a nomadic claim’s success for title always depends on whether the evidence brought 
satisfies the core elements of common law possessory title.35 Because a title claim’s 
success is a function of whether a certain level of occupancy comports with the core of 
common law title, we cannot, as the Court of Appeal would have it, state that an entire 
class of potential claims—those deemed “territorial”—can never satisfy the occupancy 
requirement. The upshot of the foregoing, then, is that the Supreme Court’s caution in 
Marshall;Bernard does not, as the Court of Appeal suggests, entail a categorical 
conclusion that sufficient occupancy must be site-specific. In fact, the Court of Appeal’s 
conclusion is actually inconsistent with McLachlin CJC’s test for title set out in 
Marshall; Bernard.  
 The Court of Appeal offers a second argument in favour of the proposition that 
Marshall; Bernard supports the view that title must be claimed on a site-specific basis:  
 
 The majority’s equation of sufficient occupancy for Aboriginal title with   
 the common law requirements to show title by virtue of possession is also   
 important. It supports the views that title must be claimed on a site-  
 specific basis, and that a certain regularity and intensity of presence is   
 needed before it will count as “occupancy”.36 
 
Here, the Court of Appeal directly references McLachlin CJC’s core-of-common-law title 
test, and holds that it “supports the view that title must be claimed on a site-specific 
basis.” Once again, the Court of Appeal does not explicitly provide reasons why the 
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Supreme Court’s equation of sufficient occupation with common law title supports that 
view. Presumably, the Court of Appeal is relying on a tacit premise. That is,  that the core 
of common law possession has a certain level of specificity and regularity that could only 
be matched or satisfied by a site-specific claim. If we can accept that premise, then the 
argument goes through.  
 However, it is not clear that we should accept that premise. Common law 
possession is a notoriously slippery and Heraclitean concept. Consider the dizzying rules 
around adverse possession, or constructive possession, which make it difficult to say, 
with any certainty, what the requisite level of physical control is to ground a possessory 
claim. In fact, in Marshall; Bernard, the Chief Justice is very aware of the slippery nature 
of the concept: “possession at law is a contextual, nuanced concept.”37 In fact, it is this 
recognition that leads McLachlin CJC to parse the question of sufficient occupancy into a 
factual analysis, not a conceptual determination of the cateogory of the claim: “the 
common law recognizes that possession sufficient to ground title is a matter of fact 
depending on all the circumstances, in particular the nature of the land and the manner in 
which the land is commonly enjoyed.”38 Considering the foregoing, we should not accept 
the Court of Appeal’s tacit premise that common law possession has a certain level of 
specificity and regularity. 
 Without this premise, we cannot accept the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that 
McLachlin CJC’s equation of occupancy with common law possession supports the view 
that sufficient occupancy requires site-specificity.  
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 Far from the Court of Appeal’s finding that territorial claim is inconsistent with 
the jurisprudence, our discussion of Marshall; Bernard shows us that it is inconsistent to 
rule such a claim out. McLachlin CJC’s equation of sufficient occupancy with common 
law possession entails not a predetermined level of specificity or intensity, but the need 
for a careful and contextual analysis of the facts to determine if a particular occupancy 
will satisfy the “core” of common law possessory title.  
 At this point then, we can say that the Court of Appeal’s first argument for site-
specificity, drawing on previous statements in Delgamuukw and Marshall; Bernard, is 
not tenable. Neither case, nor the combination of the two, provided defensible 
justifications for the conclusion that sufficient occupancy need be site-specific.  
 We can now move to the second argument offered by the Court of Appeal in 
favour of the site-specific understanding of sufficient occupancy, outlined in brief by 
Groberman J here:   
 
  I do not see a broad territorial claim as fitting within the purposes behind  
  s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 or the rationale for the common law’s  
  recognition of Aboriginal title.39 
 
As the language suggests, this will be a purposive argument: the Court of Appeal aims to 
lay out its understanding of the telos of section 35 of the Constitution Act and the 
motivations for the recognition of title, and then argue that a territorial understanding of 
occupancy does not square with those purposes.  
 The Court of Appeal’s understanding of the section 35 is that Aboriginal rights 
writ large, including Aboriginal title, have as their end or purpose the protection of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 William at para 219.  
	   Wilson	  20 
Aboriginal people’s cultural security and continuity.40 Aboriginal title then, is one 
particular type of culture-protecting right granting exclusive possession over traditional 
lands. The rationale for that protection is that in some instances, continued connection 
with the land itself is central to the culture’s security and identity. As the Court of Appeal 
eloquently puts it earlier in the judgment, “If exclusive occupation is critical to the 
traditional culture and identity, then the law must recognize and protect aboriginal 
title.”41 So, we can then say that the purpose of section 35 rights, broadly speaking, is the 
protection of Aboriginal cultural security and continuity, with Aboriginal title being one 
particular tool of protection.  
 However, the Court of Appeal does not follow the purposive argument through. 
After setting out what it takes to be the purpose of section 35 generally and title 
specifically, it does not offer reasons as to why, at the conceptual level, a non site-specific 
claim would not square with those purposes. Instead, the Groberman J turns to the facts 
of the Tsilhqot’in case and writes that “It is not clear to me, however, that the Tsilhqot’in 
culture and traditions cannot be fully respected without recognizing Aboriginal title over 
all the land on which they roamed.”42 Now, we may be able to offer some findings from 
the Trial Judge which cast serious doubt on the factual accuracy of the Court of Appeal’s 
statement,43 what is important for our purposes is that there is no argument given by the 
Court of Appeal which would support the proposition that a non site-specific claim would 
be inimical to the purposes of section 35.  
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 In fact, previous jurisprudence, including Delgamuukw, seems to suggest 
precisely the opposite. In his concurring opinion, La Forest J wrote that “aboriginal 
occupancy refers not only to the presence of aboriginal peoples in villages or 
permanently settled areas. Rather, the use of adjacent lands and even remote territories to 
pursue a traditional mode of life is also related to the notion of occupancy.”44 That is, the 
relevance question for occupancy is, as the Court of Appeal itself notes, whether or not 
exclusive occupancy is critical to the groups ‘cultural identity,’45 or in La Forest J’s 
terms, “way of life.”  
	   The Court of Appeal then shifts directions, and defends the site-specific 
understanding of occupancy by arguing against the plaintiff’s characterization of it as a 
“postage stamp” view of title:  
 
  The fallacy in the plaintiff’s characterization of the defendants’ positions  
  as representing a “postage stamp” view of Aboriginal title is that it ignores 
  the importance of Aboriginal rights other than title in protecting traditional 
  culture and lifestyles.46 
 
The Court of Appeal’s suggestion is that the “postage stamp” view of title is a 
cartographical straw man, which the Trial Judge proceeds to knock down. According to 
Griberman J, the “fallacy” is that in casting the site-specific view of title as postage-
stamp, the plaintiff’s fail to recognize the possibility of connecting particularly intensely 
used areas with broader areas in which certain other Aboriginal rights can be exercised.47 
That is, we can connect the site-specific title areas with activity rights in order to achieve 
the goals of section 35. Groberman J puts it this way:  
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  The result for semi-nomadic First Nations like the Tsilhqot’in is not a  
  patchwork of unconnected “postage stamp” areas of title, but rather a  
  network of specific sites over which title can be proven, connected by  
  broad areas in which various identifiable Aboriginal rights can be   
  exercised. This is entirely consistent with their traditional culture and with  
  the objectives of s. 35.48 
This argument is quite deft. Although it does not support the Groberman J’s overall 
argument that a non site-specific model of title does not fit with the goals of section 35, it 
does show that those goals can possibly achieved through the use of all of the various 
constitutional protections available under section 35. We should note this and be aware of 
the possibility of such an occurrence. However, we can say, in reply, two things. First, 
that the factual findings of the Trial Judge do seem to suggest that a broader view of title 
over the “proven” claim area would be necessary for the proper protection of the 
Tsilhqot’in culture.49 Connection with the land in the Claim Area itself was, in many 
respects, critical to the inherited cultural identity of the appellants. Second, that the court 
in Delgamuukw cautioned against reducing Aboriginal title to a bundle of activity rights 
for strictly traditional customs and traditions: we must not think we can always 
supplement the value of title by granting narrow activity rights which may amount to “a 
legal straitjacket on aboriginal peoples who have a legitimate claim to the land.”50 The 
Court of Appeal’s alternative suggestion, in which a series of activity rights are linked by 
limited areas of aboriginal title, may end up functioning as a legal straitjacket to the 
Tshilqot’in way of life.  
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 With the foregoing said, we can now say that the Court of Appeal has not 
provided us a persuasive purposive argument for a site-specific picture of title. As 
Groberman J himself emphasized, the telos of title is to protect exclusive occupation 
where that occupation is critical to the cultural identity of Aboriginal peoples.51 The 
sufficient character or quality of that occupation should be indexed to the cultural 
significance of the occupation, not a narrow categorization of acceptable precision.  
 The final argument offered by the Court of Appeal for its dismissal of the 
“territorial” model is an argument from reconciliation. That is, the Court of Appeal 
argues that the site-specific model is concordant with the broad goal of reconciling 
Aboriginal rights and wider Canadian interests, and that any more diffuse, non site-
specific interpretation does not further the reconciliatory imperative. As Groberman J 
writes of the site-specific view:  
 
  It seems to me that this view of Aboriginal title and Aboriginal rights is  
  fully consistent with the case law. It is also consistent with broader goals  
  of reconciliation. There is a need to search out a practical compromise that 
  can protect Aboriginal traditions without unnecessarily interfering with  
  Crown sovereignty and with the well-being of all Canadians. As I see it,  
  an overly-broad recognition of Aboriginal title is not conducive to these  
  goals. Lamer C.J.C.’s caution in Delgamuukw that “we are all here to  
  stay” was not a mere glib observation to encourage negotiations. Rather, it 
  was a recognition that, in the end, the reconciliation of Aboriginal rights  
  with Crown sovereignty should minimize the damage to either of those  
  principles.52 
The argument seems to run as follows. The Court of Appeal first outlines what it takes to 
be the “broader goal of reconciliation,” that is, the reaching of a practical compromise 
which on the one hand, protects Aboriginal traditions, while at the same time not 
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unnecessarily interfering with Crown sovereignty and the welfare of Canadians writ 
large. If we take “principles” in the last sentence to be referring to the Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal interests in tension, then the Court of Appeal is also suggesting that such 
a compromise should aim to limit the damage to both sets of concerns. To sum up then, 
Groberman J is forwarding a picture of reconciliation as a process of coming to a 
pragmatic arrangement that respects and minimally impairs the interests in tension or 
conflict. We can call this premise (1):  
 (1) In the context of Aboriginal rights, reconciliation is a process of coming to a 
 pragmatic arrangement or practical compromise respecting and minimally 
 impairing the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal interests engaged.  
Groberman J’s next move is to argue that an overly-broad recognition of title, that is, 
what the Court of Appeal sees as following from an endorsement of the “territorial” 
understanding of sufficient occupancy, would hinder the possibility of achieving 
reconciliation. Presumably, though this is not stated, this is because an overly-broad 
recognition of title would lead to more title claims being made out in such a manner as to 
“minimally impair” any non-Aboriginal interests in play. As an unstated corollary, a 
more narrow, site-specific interpretation would lead to less impairment of third party 
interests. So, we can state the Court of Appeal’s second premise as follows:  
 (2) A territorial or non-site-specific understanding of sufficient occupancy would 
 increase the number of defensible Aboriginal title claims, and thus unnecessarily 
 damage non-Aboriginal interests.  
This leads us to the Court of Appeal’s conclusion:  
 (3) From (1) and (2), it follows that we should not endorse a non site-specific 
 interpretation of sufficient occupancy, because it is not consistent with minimal-
 impairment goal of reconciliation.  
Premises (1) and (2) of this simple argument, as stated, do not, without more, entail the 
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conclusion in (3). What is missing from premise (2) is an explanation of how an increase 
in the number of title clams granted actually damages third party interests. We need to 
add an additional, and perhaps obvious, unstated premise: that judicial recognition of 
Aboriginal title automatically entails an enforcement of that title. Automatic and total 
enforcement of one set of interests would be no ‘reconciliation’ indeed, as it would not 
minimally impair both principles. Rather it would wholly privilege the Aboriginal claim 
over the non-Aboriginal claim. If recognition of title entails complete enforcement of a 
superior claim (that is, Aboriginal title over a Crown or third-party claim) then the Court 
of Appeal’s conclusion is warranted, and it their rejection of the territorial model remains 
sensible.  
 However, we do not have to accept this unstated premise. There is a way to 
separate juristic recognition of title and its complete enforcement. To explain, we must 
first rehearse an argument from Professor Slattery.  
 In the Metamorphosis, Professor Slattery has argued that the common law of 
Aboriginal title, like the common law generally, has evolved alongside important societal 
changes.53 Common law Aboriginal title, in its original form, which Professor Slattery 
calls “historical title,” recognized that Aboriginal nations living under the protection of 
the Crown had a defensible possessory right to lands not ceded to the Crown, with the 
traditional remedy being expulsion of those occupying such lands.54 This title is first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Supra note 15 page 259.  
54 Ibid page 260, 262.  
	   Wilson	  26 
recognized in the Royal Proclamation of 1763,55 a document which itself is indexed to the 
particular and largely insular relationship between Aboriginals and Crown settlement 
communities which existed at the time. Professor Slattery calls the common law 
principles that arose out of the assertion of sovereignty and were manifest in the Royal 
Proclamation the “Principles of Recognition.” Professor Slattery notes that although the 
provisions of the Proclamation were reasonably well-adapted to the circumstances at the 
time of drafting, they became “increasingly inadequate to deal with the changed situation 
of Indigenous peoples and consequently underwent a significant transformation,” 56 
becoming what Professor Slattery terms the “Principles of Reconciliation:”  
  Given this new reality, the common law did not remain idle but adapted to 
  take account of the change in circumstances. The adaptation was shaped  
  by three needs: to ensure the continuity of aboriginal title and its   
  recognition in a modern form; to supply appropriate remedies for the  
  wrongs visited on Indigenous peoples; and to accommodate public and  
  private interests in the lands concerned. These needs gave rise to common  
  law Principles of Reconciliation, which supplemented and modified the  
  traditional Principles of Recognition applying at the time of Crown  
  sovereignty.57 
That is a new body of common law around title has emerged. Whereas the Principles of 
Recognition govern the nature and scope of aboriginal title at the time of Crown 
sovereignty, the Principles of Reconciliation govern the legal effects of title, in modern 
times.58 The most important effect of these new principles is that they transform historical 
title, a static right, into what Professor Slattery calls a “generative right,” that is, one that 
exists in a dynamic or latent form,  “capable of particular articulation by the courts, but 
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whose full implementation requires agreement between the Indigenous party and the 
Crown.”59 That is, the role of the court is to recognize core elements of a generative, 
right, enough to provide a foundation for negotiations and to ensure that the Indigenous 
party enjoys a significant portion of its rights pending the final agreement.60  
 The Principles of Recognition, then, function to signal the court’s 
acknowledgement of the legitimacy of an Aboriginal group’s title claim, grounded in the 
relationship between the group and the land in question. The Principles of Reconciliation 
“take as their starting point” the former, but also consider other factors, such as the later 
history of the land, the Indigenous group’s contemporary interests, and third party and 
societal interests.61 They then partially implement title as a generative right, and leave it 
to the parties to completely instantiate the right through a treaty or other negotiating 
process.  
 We are now in a position to return to our original point, that we need not assume 
that the recognition of Aboriginal title automatically entails its full enforcement, and thus, 
that we should not accept the Court of Appeal’s argument from reconciliation for site-
specific occupancy. Professor Slattery argues that if we fail to distinguish between these 
two sets of principles, “we may fall into the trap of assuming that historical aboriginal 
title gives rise automatically to modern title, without regard to its broader social 
impact.62” This is precisely what the Court of Appeal has done in its reconciliation-based 
argument for the site-specific model. In fact, Professor Slattery predicts this kind of 
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finding explicitly:  
  Unless we distinguish between these two sets of principles, we may fall  
  into the trap of assuming that historical aboriginal title gives rise   
  automatically to modern title, without regard to its broader social impact.  
  Such an assumption fosters two judicial tendencies. The courts may be led  
  to construe historical aboriginal title in an artificially restrictive way, in  
  the effort to minimize conflicts with modern societal and third party  
  interests. Alternately, an expansive view may be taken of the processes  
  whereby historical title is extinguished, whether by Crown action or the  
  passage of time.63 
We can see the Court of Appeal engaging in this kind of artificially restrictive 
construction of title at precisely this juncture. Failing to appreciate that recognition of 
title does not entail complete enforcement, and thus attempting to avoid a misperceived 
automatic derogation of non-Aboriginal interests, the Court argues for a narrower 
understanding of title, that is, one that is site-specific. This artificial narrowing, Professor 
Slattery argues, is detrimental:  
  These tendencies, if left to operate unchecked, will diminish the possibility 
  of reconciliation ever occurring. For the successful settlement of   
  aboriginal claims must involve the full and unstinting recognition of the  
  historical reality of aboriginal title, the true scope and effects of   
  Indigenous dispossession, and the continuing links between an Indigenous  
  people and its traditional lands.64 
The emphasis here is on the fact that an integral part of reconciliation is the fulsome and 
honest recognition, by the court, of several important realities. First, the court must 
stipulate the reality of historical title; second, the court must appreciate the true breadth 
and depth of the historical dispossession of Aboriginal lands; third, the court must 
acknowledge the potential profoundness of the persisting connection between 
Aboriginals and traditional lands. Reconciliation must be “full and unstinting.” Anything 
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less, including the artificial narrowing of the concept of title, is an indignity to the 
Indigenous people’s whose legitimate claims persist. As Professor Slattery remarks, to 
limit our recognition of the scope and force of these claims is to “rub salt into open 
wounds.”65  
 Had the Court of Appeal been alive to the distinction between the Principles of 
Reconciliation and the Principles of Recognition, it would not have made the argument 
from reconciliation. The conclusion of that argument, that the sufficient occupancy 
requirement be interpreted in a narrow, site-specific manner, does not facilitate the goal 
of reconciliation. Rather, it frustrates it. Far from providing a foundation for a meaningful 
compromise that respects the historical and legal realities of aboriginal title, while giving 
due consideration to the modern rights holders, a site-specific model, from the outset, 
belittles and deflates the doctrine of aboriginal title. On this point then, we can reject the 
Court of Appeal’s argument for site-specificity from reconciliatory grounds.  
 At this point, we have extensively canvassed, reconstructed, and criticized each of 
the Court of Appeal’s arguments for the respondent’s understanding of sufficient 
occupancy. If the foregoing it is correct, we should not endorse the Court’s overall 
conclusions that a more diffuse, non-site specific model is either (i) inconsistent with 
previous jurisprudence, (ii) inimical to the purposes of section 35, or (iii) inconsistent 
with the broader goals of reconciliation. As a result, we should not, as the Court of 
Appeal has held, find that in order to ground an Aboriginal title claim, one must forward 
a clearly defined, intensely used tract of land.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Ibid.  
	   Wilson	  30 
 But what should be the standard for occupation? It seems intuitive to suggest that 
we offer the opposite view: that a territorial, or non-site specific model be forwarded as 
sufficient. The truth of the matter is, however, that none of the arguments above have 
actually shown that the appellant’s model is correct. Rather, the foregoing has established 
that the jurisprudence does not preclude the success of a title claim that is not site-
specific. That is, among the set of possible, jurisprudentially defensible title-grounding 
claims, there are at least some which are not site-specific.  
 What all of this goes to show, I think, is that to ask what ‘category’ of claim will 
be sufficient is to ask the wrong question. Terminological side-taking isn’t all that helpful 
to the parties making their arguments, or to the court. We may become cumini sectores, 
splitting hairs (or categories) that, in the end, do not aid in answering the central question 
at hand. The central question—whether a particular mode of occupation will satisfy a title 
claim—comes out of a pithy statement of the law’s central concern. This statement comes 
out of the Court of Appeal’s discussion about aboriginal title generally:  
  The law must recognize and protect aboriginal title where exclusive  
  occupation of the land is critical to the traditional culture and identity of  
  an Aboriginal group.66  
The first clause of the sentence recognizes a kind of imperative or duty. The court must  
both ‘recognize’ and ‘protect’ aboriginal title. This echoes the language of section 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982, while at the same time adding a more active verb, ‘protect,’ in 
place of the constitution verb of ‘affirm.’ More interesting though is the Court of 
Appeal’s description of when this duty to recognize and protect is engaged. That is, it 
provides a simple, and yet powerful evaluative standard. The benefits and burdens of title 
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are triggered where exclusive occupation of the land is critical to the traditional culture 
and identity of an Aboriginal group. Title tracks a particular attachment: the strength of a 
people’s connection with their land, such that that connection itself forms a significant 
part of their collective identity. This attachment itself, once recognized, is what justifies 
the acknowledgement of the right to the land and the imposition of its correlative duties 
and obligations on others. As recognized by Professor Slattery:  
  It is the strong spiritual, legal, and material bonds that Indigenous peoples  
  hold with their lands that animate aboriginal title and supply its underlying 
  rationale.67 
If it is these bonds which animate and justify Aboriginal title, then perhaps it is these 
bonds we should look to in answering our standard of occupancy question. Perhaps, when 
asking the question of whether or not one instance of occupation is sufficient to ground 
title, we should not debate about what category of use will be sufficient, but rather 
whether the facts of that instance of occupation can establish the critical connection 
between the land and a group’s cultural identity. If our goal in recognizing and affirming 
a group’s right to exclusive occupation is to protect the cultural identity of those groups, 
it is a mistake to ask whether their occupation of the land meets some abstract and 
predetermined category of sufficiency. Rather, we must ask if their exclusive occupation, 
understood from their perspective is essential to who they are as a people. The question 
would not be, does their occupation fall into a category of “sufficient” occupation? 
Rather, do the facts of their occupation demonstrate a connection with the land essential 
to their identity? Or, to put it another way, does the evidence satisfy the crucial “central 
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significance” requirement for title? Is the group’s connection with the land of a central 
significance to their culture?68  
 To more succinctly state the upshot of the above paragraphs: to parse sufficient 
occupancy along predetermined categories of possession as “good enough” or 
insufficiently precise is to misdirect our attention.  I suggest that our analysis of sufficient 
occupation should be consistent with the overall goal of title granting, that is, recognize 
and protect instances of exclusive occupation where that occupation is critical or crucial 
to the cultural identity of the claimant group. None of the variables considered by the 
site-specific/territorial debate actually point, themselves, to such a connection. They are 
good indicators of such a connection, and may signal the presence of such a connection, 
they cannot be enough to ground an inference to the kind of bond that title is meant to 
protect. Specificity of boundaries and intensity of use are themselves, just descriptions, 
which may or may not accompany the profound connection between land and cultural 
identity that title contemplates. What would ground such a claim are the kinds of 
qualitative, historical, moral, and spiritual arguments given by those witnesses called by 
the appellants in William. It is these direct connections which must be our focus when 
wondering about whether an occupation was sufficient for title.  
 Again, our question should be: have the claimants provided evidence which 
demonstrates that their exclusive occupation of the land is central or critical to their 
collective identity as a people? In addition to being more congruent with the goal of 
aboriginal title overall, such a line of inquiry would be preferable to the territorial/site-
specific discourse on the question for the following reasons:  
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 First, this method of analysis is consistent with the jurisprudence. A court’s 
answer to this question will be, of necessity, fact-specific: the court must look to the 
evidence provided and decide if the crucial cultural identity and land connection 
contemplated by Aboriginal title is present. This will require an analysis of the kinds of 
factors suggested by Professor Slattery and affirmed by Lamer CJC as a guide to the 
occupancy question in Delgamuukw.69 Courts must consider the group’s size, it’s manner 
of life, resources and technological abilities, and the character of the lands claimed. It 
also squares with McLachlin CJC’s holding that finding title in cases of nomadic or semi-
nomadic peoples –which, by definition, are likely to be “territorial” in nature—“depends 
on the evidence.”70  
 Second, this line of inquiry provides plausible answers for two additional 
lingering questions in the jurisprudence on Aboriginal title. First, it provides a more 
tenable explanation for the redundancy of the central significance requirement. Recall 
that Lamer CJC held that the requirement that aboriginal activity rights be those that were 
“a central and significant part of the society’s distinctive culture” also operates in a title 
claim. However, unlike the Van der Peet test for activity rights which explicitly requires 
a demonstration of an activity’s central significance, such an explicit demonstration is not 
required in title analysis because the occupancy requirement for title makes it 
redundant.71 As rehearsed above, Lamer CJC held that when the two prongs of the 
occupancy requirement (occupation and the maintenance of a substantial connection) 
were satisfied, one could infer central significance. Recall also that we argued that 
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neither of those prongs, in themselves, provide us with any ground for finding central 
significance.72 As a result, we may be left unsatisfied and unwilling to accept that central 
significance is really entailed by the occupation requirement so understood.  
 That worry disappears on our proposed understanding of the occupancy question 
as a fact-specific inquiry seeking evidence of central significance. If we understand 
sufficient occupancy as occupancy which, on the facts, demonstrates central significance, 
the redundancy noted by the Chief Justice makes perfect sense. We need not ask about 
whether or not a claimed land has central significance to a group’s cultural identity 
during a title claim, because one aspect of the test for that claim, namely, the occupancy 
requirement, itself aims at finding central significance.  
 In addition to offering a better explanation of the noted redundancy, our central-
significance understanding of occupation may provide a concrete opportunity for the 
Court to consider the “Aboriginal perspective” during an analysis of title claim. The 
importance of taking the Aboriginal perspective on land into account was affirmed in 
Delgamuukw:  
	  
  This debate over the proof of occupancy reflects two divergent views of  
  the source of aboriginal title.  The respondents argue, in essence, that  
  aboriginal title arises from the physical reality at the time of sovereignty,  
  whereas the Gitksan effectively take the position that aboriginal title arises 
  from and should reflect the pattern of land holdings under aboriginal  
  law.  However, as I have explained above, the source of aboriginal title  
  appears to be grounded both in the common law and in the aboriginal  
  perspective on land; the latter includes, but is not limited to, their systems  
  of law.   It follows that both should be taken into account in establishing  
  the proof of occupancy.73 
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Indeed, Lamer CJC goes further and holds that true reconciliation of aboriginal and non-
aboriginal interests in land will require that our analysis of occupation and exclusivity 
place equal weight on both perspectives.74 Taking up the aboriginal perspective includes, 
but is not limited to, referencing a claimant group’s system of law.75  
 Our central-significance understanding of occupancy provides one substantive 
way in which the Aboriginal perspective can be taken into account during title analysis. 
As argued above, the court would have to consider cultural-historical evidence that could 
substantiate a finding that exclusive occupation of the land was crucial to the cultural 
identity of the claimant group. This evidence would include the Aboriginal group’s 
understanding of its own practices, traditions, and written and oral histories that speak to 
such a connection. That is, a judicial determination of sufficient occupancy would require 
the court’s appreciation of the Aboriginal group’s view of their own interest in the land.  
Thus, our non-category based, central-significance understanding of the occupancy 
requirement is not only consistent with the previous leading jurisprudence, it also adds to 
it by filling some gaps of uncertainty in the existing case law.  
 To conclude, we have taken some small strides in understanding the conceptual 
and practical hornet’s nest that is Aboriginal title. Further, we have provided reasons for 
not adopting the Court of Appeal’s narrow interpretation of sufficient occupancy, and 
suggested that the whole site-specific/territorial debate is orthogonal to the central 
question at hand. Realizing this, we offered an alternative line of inquiry for determining 
specific occupancy, one that is fact-specific and indexed to a connection of central 
significance between a land claim and the cultural identity of the claimant group. 
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Sometimes, it pays to remember what one’s purpose is. A reminder that title protects 
exclusive occupation where that occupation is of critical value to a group’s identity, to 
who they are as a people, can refocus our energies towards ascertaining the character of 
the connection between people and the land. That connection, as suggested on historical 




	   	  
	  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
	  
